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Has Pakistan pulled off a diplomatic coup of sorts?

The past week, Islamabad has emerged as a key mediator, getting Washington and Tehran to declare a ceasefire and also getting them to talk for the first time since the Iranian revolution.

While the talks have now been called off with the United States saying it will naively blockade Iran, does the Islamabad summit mean a shot in the arm for Pakistan’s global image?

To break it down, Scroll speaks to US political scientist and Pakistan expert, Christine Fair. This is a slightly edited version of our conversation.

So is this a diplomatic win for Pakistan or is too much being read into this?

No, I think it’s without doubt a huge diplomatic win. Over the past 14-15 months, Pakistan has really been able to insert itself back into the US policy agenda. It began with Pakistan handing over this so-called mastermind of the Abbey Gate attack in Kabul. [Indian journalist] Praveen Swamy describes this man as anything but a mastermind. He describes him as a low-level operative and a chicken farmer [laughs]. But nonetheless, the US and Pakistan went ahead with this drama, and the US accoladed Pakistan back.

Pakistan also was an early donator to Trump’s son’s crypto scam, which was basically a pay and play. Then we’ll recall during Operation Sindoor Pakistan also snatched victory from the jaws of defeat.

I call this the politics of Pakistan’s chaploosi [sucking up].

It played to Trump’s ego, nominated him for the Nobel Peace Prize, backed Trump when he claimed that Trump had averted a nuclear crisis. And the Indians, in contrast, didn’t play along at all, really, to India’s disadvantage. So this is just the apotheosis of what has been a trajectory that’s been building well over the past more than a year.

So you raise a couple of two key points there, which I want to dig into. One is Trump and the other is Operation Sindoor. Do you think Pakistan wouldn't have been where it is now if there wasn’t Trump, if the US had a more “normal” president?

If we had a sane president instead of an egotistical maniac, I don’t think Pakistan would be where it is. Personally, I think what happened at Operation Sindoor was a path-dependent event. I also think that had Operation Sindoor not happened, this [Islamabad] summit may not have happened.

Take us back to Operation Sindoor. Why do you think that was a moment which led to the Islamabad summit?

You’ll recall that Trump was saying that he personally was involved in the de-escalation of the crisis, that he averted nuclear war, that he averted the death of millions. Every Indian official top to bottom pushed back on this, saying it absolutely wasn’t true, which precipitated for India this 50% tariff nonsense.

Pakistan, by contrast, in a diplomatic jujutsu move, played into it. They said, yes, Trump, you did this. You saved millions. You averted nuclear disaster. And then they nominated him for the Nobel Peace Prize, which is something that Trump is maniacally obsessed over.

I think there’s a clip of Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif at the US at the Board of Peace where he is rather embarrassingly trying to inveigle himself into Trump’s good books. It’s almost painful to watch. But you’re saying that’s actually got Pakistan some rewards.

I call it chaploosi for a reason. They’re really good at it. President Biden was very resistant to it. But Pakistan’s charms play right into Trump’s egotistical, maniacal nature.

And it’s quite a reversal because after the United States withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021, there were talks of no global role for Pakistan at all. And now you’ve gone from there to the Islamabad summit, where it has this key global role. And a lot of this is being driven by, as you are very eloquently putting it, chaploosi. So what does India do now? India has always had an aim of isolating Pakistan diplomatically. Do you see this as also a loss for India? Is it, to some extent, a zero-sum game in South Asia?

So I understand that Indians view this as a zero-sum game. If there is something good for Pakistan, then it must be bad for India. I don’t view it this way at all. Because India has also had very good relations with Iran. And in a different world, you could have imagined India playing that role.

But look at the messaging that came out of the Modi government about India not being a broker country. The messaging that came out of the Indian government did not do itself any great favors.

So you’re saying in international circles, when reportedly S Jaishankar called Pakistan a dalal nation…

I was honestly astonished at the use of the word dalal. Every Hindi speaker knows, every Urdu speaker knows what dalal means. Even this white lady knows what dalal means [laughs]. I don’t think it served India at all to use that kind of language. It made India look churlish, jealous, and that it saw the world as a zero-sum game.

Now, in fact, this probably does reflect how India views the situation. But those are the things that are best kept unsaid.

You’re saying India should not have actually vocalised its displeasure. It should have just played this out.

It should have played it out. It certainly should not have used the word dalal. I mean, it means pimp. It’s really a word that’s beneath someone of his stature. When there are so many other synonyms that he could have used. Of course, it also means middleman or broker, but everyone knows on the street what dalal means.

What does this actually mean for Pakistan? So it’s got the limelight. There are world leaders flying to Islamabad. The world media is looking at it. But in a near to medium term, what does this mean for the country of Pakistan as well as its security establishment?

I think the Indians would have behooved themselves to just sit this one out, because it doesn’t change Pakistan’s economic precarity. It doesn’t change the fact that Pakistan is a supporter of terrorism.

What I thought was really fascinating, and I didn’t see too much commentary about it, even while the negotiations were going on, Pakistan sent a fleet of aircraft to Saudi Arabia as a part of its mutual defense pact. So Pakistan is also in a very precarious situation. How does it manage its relations with Saudi Arabia while it’s attempting to play this role of peace broker between the United States and Iran?

Pakistan-Saudi defense pact, which is actually, it seems Riyadh wanted to activate it during the Iran war, and Pakistan resisted it. How do you see this pact going forward in the near to medium term, given West Asia is going to be a bit of a hot mess?

I’m not a Saudi Arabia expert so I don’t want to veer too far away from my wheelhouse, but I think it puts Pakistan in a pretty significant predicament. The very fact that it was sending aircraft to Saudi Arabia, even while the negotiations were going on in Islamabad is actually a pretty big deal that very few people have remarked upon.

And what’s in no one’s control is Israel. I think Israel is the biggest spoiler. Israel, more than any other country, wants the US to continue the conflict in Iran because basically Israel is a free rider. Israel is getting its primary foe depreciated at the American taxpayers expense, and it has no incentive to play along. So these are issues that are well beyond Pakistan’s control.

The Pakistani government also said that there was still the possibility of ongoing negotiations, which was at odds with what the Americans said. So the status of play is a little bit unclear.

Do you think Israel would be unhappy that Pakistan has this role, given that Israel and Pakistan don't really have the best of relations?

The interesting thing is at different points in time, Pakistan has floated the balloon of normalising relations with Israel. You’ll recall Musharraf tried this. He floated this balloon and he was shot down.

Pakistanis realise that if they were to have this relationship with Israel, that it would really solidify their relationship with the Americans. So they understand that endpoint. But it’s how you get there that is the huge challenge, given that Pakistan has spent so much of its state effort proselytising to Pakistanis how terrible the Israelis are.

And to be fair, I think that Israelis are terrible. What they’re doing in Gaza is genocide. What they’re doing in the West Bank is ethnic cleansing. What they’re doing in Lebanon is unacceptable. But the kind of vitriolic propaganda that Pakistan has spent decades spreading about Israel will really make it difficult for Pakistan to to make a pragmatic approach towards normalising relations with Israel.

But at different points in time, as I said, the army has floated this balloon.

I think the Pakistan passport is not valid for Israel.

Right now, the talks, it seems, have failed, although, of course, you never know in politics what’s going to happen tomorrow. Do you think the talks failing will actually reflect badly on Pakistan or just the fact that it mediated it is good enough?

No, I don’t think it reflects poorly on Pakistan at all. I’ve been very critical of the negotiation team that the United States sent. It sent [United States Special Envoy to the Middle East] Witkoff and it sent [Trump’s son-in-law] Kushner. Neither of these gentlemen have a clue about nuclear proliferation, about Iran’s nuclear programme. Neither of these gentlemen have a clue about Iran. So we sent our junior varsity team, but the Iranians, in contrast, sent a highly sophisticated team.

Americans are just generally clueless about Iran. Just because Iran has been diplomatically isolated from the United States doesn’t mean that Iran is diplomatically isolated. And so I think Americans underestimate the sophistication of Iranian diplomats and Iranian policymakers. And the simple fact, as far as I can tell, is that the Americans were not there to negotiate. They were there to issue ultimatums. And if you don’t come with the mindset that we’re here to negotiate, which means not everyone gets what they want, these talks were doomed to fail.

You think the US just went to Islamabad prepared to torpedo talks? They knew that they wanted conflict to break out again?

So I think there was a desire for an off ramp because the Americans are deeply opposed to this war. Gas prices are soaring.

But Trump is, there’s just no other way to put it, a clown. He is unknowledgeable. He is unsophisticated. Iran is playing chess, and he’s playing Hungry Hungry Hippos. He’s out of his depth. He doesn’t have a clue. And now he’s got this policy of issuing a naval blockade over the Strait of Hormuz when one of the policy objectives was having free navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. And you can see that he’s flailing. He doesn’t really know how to put the toothpaste back into the tube. And I think he also really underestimated how much leverage the Iranians have.

Where do you see China in this? We just discussed the fact that Pakistan has managed to inveigle itself back into Washington’s good books. Would this worry Beijing? Does this lessen Beijing's control over Islamabad?

That’s a view that’s very popular in India. But if you actually look at the history of the relations that Pakistan has had with the United States and China, it’s never been a zero sum game. And it’s not at present. I think the more interesting role that China is playing is aiding the Iranians in targeting the Americans. And not just the Chinese, also the Russians are helping the Iranians to target the Americans. They’re providing intelligence, and they’re also providing ordinance. I think that’s a much more serious concern than the perceived zero-sum game that Pakistan-China relations exist at the expense of US-Pakistan relations.

In fact, from China’s point of view, because China basically views Pakistan instrumentally, it wants to prop up Pakistan so that it can be a problem for India. If the United States historically provides armaments and munitions to Pakistan, that actually advances China’s interest because it’s happening not on the Chinese exchequer. So neither the US nor China view relations with Pakistan as a zero sum game. Maybe in diplomatic talking points, but in all practicality, they don’t view it as a zero-sum game.

Pakistan’s position right now globally is almost really quite unique? To have such strong ties with both the US and China. Is there any other country like that today who could play this role?

I’m not a sinologist so I can’t speak to the panoply of China’s diplomatic relations but at first blush that sounds about right.

And this has been a long time strategic objective for Pakistan? If you go back to Nixon, it always saw itself as a bridge between the US and China?

I’m not sure that Pakistan currently views itself as a bridge. I think it has a relationship with China. It pursues that relationship. It’s a pretty comprehensive relationship.

In contrast, the relationship that Pakistan has with the United States at present is not really comprehensive. We’re not providing armaments to Pakistan. Economic assistance has been, you know, really low going back to when Trump at one point basically cut off funding to Pakistan.

If you actually look at the real terms denominated in dollars, there’s nothing there in the US-Pakistan relationship.

You think it’s very precarious? Is there a scenario where when Trump leaves office, this relationship might actually be really downgrade or even collapse?

Yes because the reality is, with the exception of tactical objectives, the US and Pakistan don’t share strategic objectives. The US still is worried about terrorism. Pakistan remains committed to terrorism. So the US and Pakistan have very few overlapping strategic interests.

So this is a huge win for Pakistan: that it was able to basically negotiate or host this incredibly profound breakthrough in US-Iran relations. There hadn’t been this level of negotiations since 1979. But it doesn't change the fact that the substance of the US-Pakistan relations, when you look at the dollars, it’s really not there.

Which is why you’re saying New Delhi is possibly overreacting.

Yes, I think it’s beneath India to behave this way about this.

How does this play out internally within the Pakistani state? Does this strengthen the army’s hand? I think I remember a friend joking to me that the biggest loser from all of this possibly is Imran Khan.

The [US] president personally thanked Shehbaz Sharif and Field Marshal Asim Munir. So this is a huge boon for the Pakistan army. But the Pakistan army has completely consolidated control over the Pakistani state. So what was the marginal boon given the complete capture of the state that the Pakistani army has effectuated? I’m not so sure.

So in the near to medium term, it really doesn’t mean much even for the Pakistan army?

I don’t think so.

What is the view within Pakistan? Are Pakistanis happy with what’s happened? Or is the opposition of the army still big enough to paper over some of these wins?
I can’t go back to Pakistan because they were not happy with my book on the Pakistan Army. So I don’t really feel comfortable saying much on this. What I have heard is that after Operation Sindoor, the contempt that people had for the Pakistan Army diminished and it was replaced with support for the Pakistan Army.

What I have heard from friends, and I have no independent means of verifying it, is that the antipathy towards the army is slowly creeping in again and I don’t really see this changing. This diplomatic coup won’t change the way ordinary Pakistanis view the Pakistan army.